What is missing from those arguments is that democracy is part of economic development. Even in China, as that economy has grown certain elements of democracy has crept into their political system. My apology, I am deviating from the point.
Many of the developing countries do not have the infrastructure for generating, transmitting, or
distributing electricity. Whatever they do have is typically rudimentary. Now this in my opinion is a good thing all around. Why? Well we all know that it is easier to write on a clean blackboard (dating myself), and so it is in establishing a power infrastructure when it is being built from scratch. Also, the pricing of electricity in these places is very high compared with the developed world. This scenario has been identified by other much smarter people than myself, so it is not a new concept.
So what is the connection between a weak infrastructure, high energy prices, and the environment? Ah, now that is the puzzle to be solved, because this triangle makes for the perfect market driven environment for the development of a renewable energy based economy. No need for the government welfare feed-in tariffs that artificially create a market for renewable energy, but can not be sustained in economies such as the ones I am talking about. In these economies the market makes for the perfect incubator.
So I say---
However, it is constrained by a limited
pipeline of bankable projects, leading experts to complain about “too much money chasing too few
bankable projects” and a lack of resources to prepare projects and develop a robust project pipeline. Increased efforts are therefore
taking place to mobilize human and financial resources and partner with countries experienced
at private‐public partnerships (PPPs) to create facilities that either offer extensive and
specialized technical assistance or combine such help with financial resources.
Quality and reliability of infrastructure services is another challenge in developing countries. Power outages and water suspensions still frequently occur, hampering productive and efficient economic and social activities. Frequent interruptions in infrastructure services are significant constraints on businesses in developing countries.
Quality and reliability of infrastructure services is another challenge in developing countries. Power outages and water suspensions still frequently occur, hampering productive and efficient economic and social activities. Frequent interruptions in infrastructure services are significant constraints on businesses in developing countries.
Infrastructure services often are public goods or
natural monopolies, or both. As such they are either run or are regulated by public entities and
thus suffer from common inefficiencies of public services.
In response to the clear infrastructure deficiencies of most developing countries, and a broad consensus in the literature that infrastructure is important for growth, a number of authors have attempted to provide estimates of infrastructure “needs”. A useful starting point of course is to determine the level of demand. Demand for infrastructure increases with income. For instance we know from empirical studies that electricity use, telephone use and automobiles increase with disposable income. Countries also tend to increase their investments in environmental amenities as they become wealthier.
First establishing the level and type of demand that is welfare-improving and, second, in order to find out whether a project is worth undertaking, relying on a mechanism that tests whether the benefits of a project or service exceed its costs. For most types of infrastructure, cost- covering prices provide such a test. Relying fully on user fees to fund infrastructure services makes sense for all sectors. Cost-covering prices provide the strongest protection against wasteful investments. Relying on prices to reveal demand implies that policymakers instruct potential providers to proceed on the assumption that they will not receive any fiscal transfers or subsidies and that regulation will allow them to set prices at cost-covering levels in the aggregate.
Providers, whether publicly or privately- owned, will then estimate demand and calibrate it against costs just as any private investors in a normal market would do. The infrastructure provider will then invest and provide the service. He/she can only make money if customers are actually willing to pay the required price. Thus it is assured that investments are welfare improving. Financing happens as in any other market and is again fundamentally the same for private or public enterprises. Firms seek to obtain bank or capital market financing based on the cash flow expected from cost-covering prices. Risks for creditors are limited by the equity of the provider. Proceeding in this way also means that policymakers themselves need not take a view on “need” or demand. They can delegate this to the service provider.
In response to the clear infrastructure deficiencies of most developing countries, and a broad consensus in the literature that infrastructure is important for growth, a number of authors have attempted to provide estimates of infrastructure “needs”. A useful starting point of course is to determine the level of demand. Demand for infrastructure increases with income. For instance we know from empirical studies that electricity use, telephone use and automobiles increase with disposable income. Countries also tend to increase their investments in environmental amenities as they become wealthier.
First establishing the level and type of demand that is welfare-improving and, second, in order to find out whether a project is worth undertaking, relying on a mechanism that tests whether the benefits of a project or service exceed its costs. For most types of infrastructure, cost- covering prices provide such a test. Relying fully on user fees to fund infrastructure services makes sense for all sectors. Cost-covering prices provide the strongest protection against wasteful investments. Relying on prices to reveal demand implies that policymakers instruct potential providers to proceed on the assumption that they will not receive any fiscal transfers or subsidies and that regulation will allow them to set prices at cost-covering levels in the aggregate.
Providers, whether publicly or privately- owned, will then estimate demand and calibrate it against costs just as any private investors in a normal market would do. The infrastructure provider will then invest and provide the service. He/she can only make money if customers are actually willing to pay the required price. Thus it is assured that investments are welfare improving. Financing happens as in any other market and is again fundamentally the same for private or public enterprises. Firms seek to obtain bank or capital market financing based on the cash flow expected from cost-covering prices. Risks for creditors are limited by the equity of the provider. Proceeding in this way also means that policymakers themselves need not take a view on “need” or demand. They can delegate this to the service provider.
Without adequate cash flow investment is not possible, and no amount of financial
engineering or PPP structuring can change this basic fact. Once prices are allowed to cover
costs, the financial constraints on infrastructure investment become significantly less
binding. Focus can then move to the optimal market structure, which is what we turn to
next.
• Improve responsiveness to the needs of investors.
Investors identified government unresponsiveness to
their needs and time frames as the most important
factor in the failure of investments. And they considered the administrative efficiency of a host government one of the top factors in their decisions to invest
in a country. Completing better preparation of trans-
actions before inviting investors to participate can
help reduce processing delays and the related opportunity costs for investors.
Maintain the stability and enforceability of laws and
contracts. A clear and enforceable legal framework is
also among the top priorities for investors. They want
the “rules of the game” to remain credible and
enforceable—not altered at the government’s convenience once they have made investment decisions
based on those rules. A government’s willingness and
ability to honor its commitments are key.
Minimize government interference. Investors are
most satisfied with investment experiences when they
are free to realize returns from their investments with-
out government interference. Where investment experiences were successful, investors pointed to their ability to exercise effective operational and management
control of their investments as a key factor. And when
investors consider investing in a country, they give
much weight to the independence of regulatory
processes from government interference.
Economies also depend on electricity
supplies that are free from interruptions and shortages
so that businesses and factories can work unimpeded.
so that businesses and factories can work unimpeded.
Africa faces a huge energy deficit: the 48 countries of sub-Saharan Africa, with a combined population
of 800 million, are estimated to generate roughly the same power output as Spain, a country of 45 million. This energy deficit is the result of the region’s limited generation capacity—the result, in turn, of a lack of long-term planning on the part of each of those countries. The lack of large-scale investment is a consequence of the limited participation of private players and the difficulties in mobilizing long-term financing from African financial systems to fund big-ticket items such as infrastructure, in places that historically have not followed a strict financial regime that encourages long term investment.
The monthly, daily, or hourly change in government, or policy, along with little internal investment makes for high risk for low returns on investment.
In addition, aging infrastructure and rising demand have led to intermittent blackouts across all regions of Africa, undermining competitiveness. The blackouts largely started in the 1990s in East and West Africa, in 2007, once again due to lack of planning or any formalized plan that was strictly followed.
of 800 million, are estimated to generate roughly the same power output as Spain, a country of 45 million. This energy deficit is the result of the region’s limited generation capacity—the result, in turn, of a lack of long-term planning on the part of each of those countries. The lack of large-scale investment is a consequence of the limited participation of private players and the difficulties in mobilizing long-term financing from African financial systems to fund big-ticket items such as infrastructure, in places that historically have not followed a strict financial regime that encourages long term investment.
The monthly, daily, or hourly change in government, or policy, along with little internal investment makes for high risk for low returns on investment.
In addition, aging infrastructure and rising demand have led to intermittent blackouts across all regions of Africa, undermining competitiveness. The blackouts largely started in the 1990s in East and West Africa, in 2007, once again due to lack of planning or any formalized plan that was strictly followed.
Energy facilities across
Africa are in urgent need of new and innovative sources
of investment, particularly for generation, transmission
lines, and distribution. This much-needed investment
is held back because across Africa—especially sub- Saharan Africa—even though tariffs are very high, they do not reflect actual cost because they account for only about 50 percent of the historical production costs. The thought process within most of these areas is that they deserve to have the lowest priced electricity on the planet, and the developed countries are obligated to provide it.
is held back because across Africa—especially sub- Saharan Africa—even though tariffs are very high, they do not reflect actual cost because they account for only about 50 percent of the historical production costs. The thought process within most of these areas is that they deserve to have the lowest priced electricity on the planet, and the developed countries are obligated to provide it.
Even beyond the much-needed physical investment,
there is an urgent need to invest in the diversification of the energy mix so as to make the infrastructure
sustainable. In East and Southern Africa, over-reliance on hydropower energy makes the economies vulnerable
to hydrological conditions. The major drought in the
mid-2000s caused substantial economic losses—as
high as 4 percent of GDP in Tanzania—and increased
the demand for expensive emergency diesel power
generation. In Northern and Western African countries,
the energy mix depends largely on gas and oil reserves
(thermal energy), which is more reliable than hydropower
but more costly.
In Djibouti a country with no conventional resources that has placed its short/mid-term economic and political life on the back of Ethiopian hydropower have suffered considerable set backs with the up and down availability of electricity. The price of electricity has not dropped since the power started coming from a 200km interconnection line as no more than 35MW is available at anyone time. The Djiboutian negotiators were out maneuvered by their Ethiopian big brothers as the metering cost is at the point of generation so that the 20% plus line loses are absorbed by the people of Djibouti. This keeps the cost of electricity at above $400/MW, with continued brown and black outs. The Ethiopian government is also able to keep their little brothers in line by a flip of a switch, which is not uncommon.
All these situations come back to the same point of lack of planning, and serious focus on long term economic development on the part of each of the countries' private and public leadership.
In Djibouti a country with no conventional resources that has placed its short/mid-term economic and political life on the back of Ethiopian hydropower have suffered considerable set backs with the up and down availability of electricity. The price of electricity has not dropped since the power started coming from a 200km interconnection line as no more than 35MW is available at anyone time. The Djiboutian negotiators were out maneuvered by their Ethiopian big brothers as the metering cost is at the point of generation so that the 20% plus line loses are absorbed by the people of Djibouti. This keeps the cost of electricity at above $400/MW, with continued brown and black outs. The Ethiopian government is also able to keep their little brothers in line by a flip of a switch, which is not uncommon.
All these situations come back to the same point of lack of planning, and serious focus on long term economic development on the part of each of the countries' private and public leadership.